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Dr. Marcia Hermansen
Professor of Theology and Director Islamic World Studies
Loyola University Chicago, USA
Email: mherman@luc.edu
ABSTRACT

This article was prepared for a 2018 conference convened at AIR University
Islamabad on ‚Radicalization: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges of Campus
Life‛. Focussing on a conference sub-theme of ‚culture‛, the article reviews
academic literature on the topic of youth radicalization, noting where existing
analyses and proposed strategies largely geared to European and American
contexts are either relevant for or unsuited to Pakistani universities and
colleges. In addition, the concept of ‚culture‛ is addressed, whether in terms of
local customs, creative expression, or sociological affinity groups, with special
attention paid to discussions of the relationship of culture to Islam. The intent is
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of Pakistani campus leaders to cultivate
positive spaces for student life and expression in culturally authentic ways. In
fact, the potentially positive aspects of ‚radical‛ student learning and
engagement in the sense of ‚getting to the root or source‛ that are part of
university education need to be recognized and preserved, so that youth are
empowered to effectively participate, question, and critique rather than resorting
to violent options.
Keywords: Radicalization, Pakistani Universities, Campus cultures, Islam
and Culture.
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Introduction
The terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘deradicalization’ are derived largely from
sources in Europe and North America. While today the specter of terrorism and
radicalism in the West is disproportionately associated with Islam and Muslims,
it is acknowledged that other causes can also lead to violent attacks on civilians,
for example, the rise of the far right or even radical environmentalism.
Radicalism, like extremism and even terrorism, is a contested and
constructed term. This problematic has been well and ably discussed in the
existing literature. The term ‘radical’ can have a positive or progressive
connotation as well since, after all, it means going back to the source—and who
gets to define what is radical? ‘Extremism’ similarly assumes a consensual
normal or middle ground, and while most religious traditions uphold the middle
way as normative—there is considerable disagreement about who gets to define
what this core or middle ground is. As a concept ‘radicalisation’ tends to merge a
number of meanings—disaffection, youth alienation, radical dissent, religious
fundamentalism, propensity to violence—which ought to be kept analytically
distinct.‛1
Literature on recruitment to extremist groups has isolated many complex
factors in this process and also distinguishes between radical ideas and actions
that cause harm through violent means. For example, P. R Neumann argues that
there are two types of radicalization: processes resulting in ‘cognitive extremism’
and those resulting in ‘behavioral extremism’.2 Both, however, are usually
summarized as what happens before the ‘bomb goes off’.3 There is also a large
body of work discussing changes in the number and sources of such attacks over
time and how factors of modernity and even post-modernity could be
responsible for these changes.
Pakistan is a nation that has suffered disproportionately from terrorist and
extremist attacks. Recent statistics (2016) say that about 7% of the terror attacks
worldwide occurred in Pakistan, which had the fourth highest total number of
incidents after Iraq, Afghanistan, and India.4 One can follow increases in such
attacks over time beginning from a handful in the years before 1986 to 60 in that
year, such that by 2006 numbers had risen to 164, then they reached over 600 in the
years after 2009, with a height of 2214 in 2013.5 A further statistic cites a total of
35,000 Pakistanis killed in extremist attacks between Sept. 11, 2001 and May 2011.
Factors usually associated with this rise in violent attacks include an increased
presence of arms after the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s participation in the
War on Terror post 9/11.6 A 2015 paper authored by Pakistani scholars found local
experts ranking causes of extremist or radical attacks as follows: lack of law
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enforcement, poverty, Pakistan’s participation in war on terror, foreign involvement,
unemployment, corruption, ethnic strife, illiteracy, and ethnic or linguistic
separatism.7
While the idea that poverty on its own inspires violence and radical
responses within societies has largely been debunked,8 there has been in the
popular imagination a sense that individuals who can be most easily recruited to
violence are those who have the least to loose materially and socially, and also
that lower levels of education make individuals more susceptible to
indoctrination and manipulation.
In fact we need to be cautious in trying to generalize understandings of
the roots of terrorism and radicalization that have cultural specificity and
distinctiveness. As a non-Pakistani observer, it appears to me that recent
concerns with radicalization on campuses in the Pakistani environment arise due
to the prevalent perception that extremism generally emerges among the least
privileged. Note that among the top causes for terrorism cited by Pakistan
scholars as previously cited were: poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. Both
globally and in Pakistan, however, this has proven not to be the case.9
As for the campus component, considering the history of student political
activism in Pakistan as opposed to extremism, easily demonstrates that
university students can be and have been mobilized at various periods in the
nation’s history.10 Similar to the case in other countries, there has been an ebb
and flow to this phenomenon, some of it associated with interventions by the
Pakistani state and some of it due to shifts in the political mood in the country. In
general, we may observe that student and youth activism and protests in
developing societies such as Pakistan have had a greater impact on national
politics and society. Many of these same societies are experiencing a ‘youth
bulge’ today, as opposed to aging populations in Europe and North America.
It seems that several 2017 incidents in Pakistan sparked media and public
awareness of college campuses as potential sites for recruitment and
radicalization and this has occasioned some soul searching as to the potential
causes. The theme of this conference in terms of ‘radicalization’ is to consider
and propose initiatives that might address these causes, especially in campus
environments, and hopefully offer solutions to a perceived trend. Of course, it is
probably more effective to take steps to curtail radicalization (i.e. counterradicalization measures) in the first place, since once individuals become
radicalized, the road to recovery is a long and intervention intensive one.
In this paper I will discuss some of the literature in the field of terrorism
and deradicalization studies. My position as a professor of Islamic Studies in the
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West, rather than a scholar of terrorism, leads me to be somewhat critical of the
generalizations of Western strategies and experiences to the Pakistan case. Much
of the material on terrorism/radicalization that has been produced in Europe, the
United States, and Canada features theories that tend to focus on factors such as
the alienation of minority [Muslim] youth populations. At the same time,
keeping in mind that any act of violence is an affront to our common humanity,
we must acknowledge the reality of the damage to families and societies that is
being caused by youth recruited to commit acts of violence, and be willing to
identify causal factors and how to address them.
The very topic of radicalization on college campuses directs our attention
to the fact that radicalism is primarily associated with youthful populations.
There are various explanations for this—both folk and academic. At the level of
folk wisdom, youth have ‚less to lose‛ in the sense of usually not yet having the
responsibilities of their own families and children to support. Also youth are
perceived as being more impulsive and volatile as well as looking for some sort
of overreaching cause that will draw together all the complexities of life and offer
a clear and compelling solution.
At the academic level explanations of why youth become radical include
observations that,
Late adolescence and early adulthood is the time when young people solidify
their political and social identities. The desire of youth to belong and be
accepted also increases their vulnerability to recruitment since in order to
both demonstrate and realize belonging in a group, it is important that
young people conform to and act upon the values of that group. For many
young people, belonging is far more important than believing. That is, they
come to articulate the values of a group because they want to belong.11
In the scholarly literature produced in the West, explanations for
radicalization usually assume Muslim immigrant backgrounds for vulnerable
youth, for example, the concept of ‚acculturation stress‛. This is a construct
proposed by psychologist A. Ryder12 that attempts to capture what youth from
Muslim immigrant backgrounds may be experiencing that would incline them to
become radicalized. ‚This set includes all the elements related to the emotional
sphere that push youth from different cultural, social and economic backgrounds
towards radical forms of Islam.‛13 Acculturation was defined decades ago as a
‚phenomenon that results when groups of individuals having different cultures
come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original
culture patterns of either or both groups‛.14 This interaction usually generates
66

Cultural Diversities: The Implications for Radicalization Theory & Practice …

stress on the people involved and may lead to negative consequences.15
According to this theory, such immigrant youth are said to be caught between
two cultures, or culturally ‘bipolar’, leading to their search for some overarching
cause or commitment.
Michael Hogg, another scholar of radicalization, lists certain explanatory
factors that may work cross-culturally, in particular ones around what he terms
‘identity uncertainty’.16 Hogg argues that the quest for personal significance
constitutes a major motivational force that may push individuals toward violent
extremism.
Kruglanski, a psychologist who works on deradicalization, summarizes
various causal factors as follows:
Our radicalization/deradicalization model contains three crucial
components: (1) the motivational component (the quest for personal
significance) that defines a goal to which one may be committed, (2) the
ideological component that in addition identifies the means of violence as
appropriate for this goal's pursuit, and (3) the social process of networking
and group dynamics through which the individual comes to share in the
violence-justifying ideology and proceeds to implement it as a means of
significance gain.17
Scholars of youth radicalization in the West have further identified
various ‚environmental factors in radicalization‛ i.e., reasons that youth may
become politically disaffected. Among them are government policies that play a
pivotal role by having a strong impact on the person’s perceptions, sense of
belonging, and affection towards the host country. In particular, two sets of
policies seem to be very relevant, foreign policy and integration policy.
Dissatisfaction with foreign policy can cause rage, anger, and frustration towards
the host country and might work as a catalyst towards radicalization. The realm
of integration of new immigrants may either be ignored or involve invasive
scrutiny and demonization.18 While such theories and explanations may
potentially stigmatize Muslim youth in particular, scholars such as Arun
Kundnani do not hesitate to point out that ‚what governments call extremism is
to a large degree a product of their own wars‛.19
The question for us to raise here is, are any of these factors and theories
relevant to the Pakistani situation? The thesis of being a member of a stigmatized
minority, for example, does not seem to apply in most cases of the radicalized,
nor do concepts of ‘acculturation stress’. More broad and applicable to at least
some features of the Pakistani experience are observations such as the following:
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Violent extremism can be best conceptualized as a kaleidoscope of complex
interlocking combinations: 1) individual socio- psychological factors; 2)
social factors; 3) political factors; 4) ideological and religious dimensions; 5)
the role of culture and identity issues; 6) trauma and other trigger
mechanisms; and three other factors that are a motor for radicalization: 7)
group dynamics; 8) radicalizers/groomers; and 9) the role of social media. It
is the combined interplay of economic grievances; a sense of injustice and
discrimination; personal crisis and tragedies; frustration; alienation; a
fascination with violence; searching for answers to the meaning of life; an
identity crisis; social exclusion; alienation; marginalization; disappointment
with democratic ideology or social network of power and control; a sense of
loyalty and commitment; a sense of excitement and adventure; a
romanticized view of ideology and cause; the possibility of heroism, personal
redemption, etc.‚20
Such broad and variegated factors seem more likely to apply across cultures
and situations but, unfortunately, would not give much assistance in anticipating
individual cases of radicalization or a propensity to take violent action.
In a paper on youth radicalization in Pakistan authored for the US based
Brookings Institute, Political Scientist Moeed Yusuf articulated some analytical
factors more relevant to cases in Muslim majority societies.
Youth radicalization is inherently tied to the issue of expectations of the
young men in a population. Educational attainment presents itself as a
double-edged sword. While a lack of education disqualifies youth from
attaining economic mobility and is thus undesirable, a high level of
education without the requisite outlet to apply skills raises expectations
which, if unfulfilled for long, can create an expectation-reality disconnect.
The latter is considered to be a common violence-inducing factor among
youth in a society. 21
A pioneering study in the field of the radicalization of youth in Muslim
societies was prepared by Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim in the
1980s,22 a time when Egypt had been rocked by violent attacks by factions such
as the Jamā‘at al-Takfīr wa-l-Hijra. Interviewing young members of such
movements in Egyptian prisons led Ibrahim to conclude that the stress of
migration from rural to urban settings and, ironically, exposure to (poorly
delivered) higher education in state universities that had become much more
widely available in recent decades, was a source of disorientation and search for
meaning among such youth. While trained in engineering or mathematics, they
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were ill equipped to deal with broader issues of interpretation and saw religion,
specifically an Islamist view of political Islam that offered a blueprint for a
utopian state and social order, as a panacea for the ills of their own society, while
being at the same time a resolution to their personal inner turmoil and
dissatisfaction. This became the paradigmatic explanation for radicalization
among educated youth in Muslim societies. For example, Peter Bergen and Swati
Pandey in a much later study calculated that that 70 out of the world’s 79 leading
Muslim terrorists (that is, 89%) were drawn from those having backgrounds in
modern mixed (religious and scientific) education.23 Such individuals are, in fact,
the majority of graduates in most Muslim majority contexts such as Pakistan.24

Radicalization and Universities
Academic literature on radicalization identifies contributing factors such
as exposure to ideology, victimization, alienation, socialization, social networks,
the internet, deficiencies in family bonds, trauma, relative social and economic
deprivation, and ‘cultures of violence’.25 This broad-brush approach has
encouraged governments to believe that they can pre-empt future terrorist
attacks through a range of interventions in everyday life. However, as this list of
possible causes indicates, the pathways of radicalization have yet to be
identified, much less the correct points in which to interrupt the process. Indeed,
research on radicalization processes and vulnerable populations are best
summarized as ‘exploratory’ rather than ‘explanatory’.26
As the processes involved remain undetermined, radicalization is
frequently reduced to the profiling of traits or attributions of signs of
radicalization in ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at-risk’ populations. In the West, these signs are
typically associated with certain ‘types’ of Muslims – bearded men, veiled
women, converts27 due to an assumed conflict between ‘Muslimness’ and a
Western identity thereby conflating Islam with ‘radicalization’ and ‘terrorism’.
Consequently concerns about ‘radicalization’ were extended to stigmatize a way
of life rather than specific behaviors or actions, which then allowed for the
securitization of ordinary and unexceptional lives, including those of students.28
The irony is that attending university is normally viewed as a sign of social and
economic success, yet it is also viewed as a site and trigger of radicalization for
Muslims.29 In a notable case from the United States, the New York Police
Department surveilled Muslim Student Associations on a range of college
campuses over an extended period of time including monitoring university
websites from Yale; Columbia; the University of Pennsylvania; Syracuse; New
York University; Clarkson University; the Newark and New Brunswick
69

AFKĀR (June 2019)

(Volume: 3, Issue: 1)

campuses of Rutgers University; the State University of New York campuses in
Buffalo, Albany, Stony Brook and Potsdam; Queens College, Baruch College,
Brooklyn College and La Guardia Community College, and actual meetings and
students within the city limits and in other areas of the state.30 Meanwhile, in
Britain, the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in February 2015,
and in particular its section on ‚Preventing People from Being Drawn into
Terrorism‛ initially mandated that those working at universities should report
any suspicious activity on the part of students, although this provision was
ultimately criticized and revised.31
Such cases in the West highlight ‚the inherent tensions facing those
involved in higher education internationally, who on the one hand are dedicated
to promoting academic freedom, free speech, intellectual curiosity, healthy
discussion and critical thinking, while at the same time preventing, restricting –
and possibly reporting –extremist, radical and intolerant ideas or behavior. This
difficult balance is further complicated by the fact that not all radical ideas, or
even radicalization of individuals, necessarily lead to violence. Healthy academic
debate and argument can often prove a powerful counter to extremist ideas.‛32

Pakistani College Campuses
Since this conference is directed to college campuses in Pakistan—let us
now consider the Pakistani context. In the case of Pakistan, college students have
often been highly involved in political and religious movements, being active
and willing to mobilize. Sometimes this level of commitment led to internal
tensions and even violence on campuses, in particular across left and right wing
groups, or religious versus secular factions.
Writing about Pakistan student politics, Matthew Nelson noted
differences across those students who pressed for the creation of an explicitly
secular state (for example, the left-leaning Democratic Students Federation); and
others who pressed for a modern ‘Islamic’ state (the Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’).
Some embraced a ‘sectarian’ agenda (for example, the Imāmia Students
Organization); and some held fast to specific ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ demands (the
Baloch Students Organization and the Pakhtun Students Federation). In each
case, however, the question was generally the same: who defines the nation/who
controls the state?33 In fact, after 1958, student politics throughout Pakistan were
dominated by a bitter struggle between the left-leaning National Student
Federation and Maulānā Mawdūdī’s (Islamist) Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’.34 In 1984
Zia-ul-Haq banned student unions as a source of potential opposition and
activism. They were allowed again in 1988 under a new regime. However,
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violent clashes resurfaced at large public campuses such that middle class
families increasingly preferred private universities for their children.
An article in Dawn commented on the perception among Pakistani law
enforcement that universities were now cites of recruitment to extremism.
‚Sources privy to the findings say the study considered a sample of 500
‘hardcore militants’ currently in Sindh's jails. It revealed that at least 64 such
militants had master’s level degrees or above. As many as 70 ‘hardcore militants’
had bachelor’s degrees, while 63 had matriculate and intermediate degrees.‛35
Surveillance on Pakistani campuses is also nothing new. It is reported that:
Since the launch of the government’s National Action Plan to counter
terrorism in December 2014, the BZU [Bahāuddīn Zakariyya] campus and
its 35,000-strong student body have been under 24-hour surveillance.
Intelligence agency officials have also been stationed at the university to
monitor militant activities, particularly recruitment, that may be
underway.36
A further article highlights the trend to recruitment to extremist groups
among educated populations and potentially on Pakistan’s campuses:
A 2013 study on the anti-India group Lashkar-e-Ṭaibah (LeT) found that its
recruits tend to be more educated than the average Pakistani. Sixty-three
percent have secondary education, and some have enrolled in undergraduate
degree programs.37 Another study found that 17 percent of LeT militants are
educated to the intermediate level or higher.38As madrassas, the traditional
recruiting grounds of militant groups, come under greater government
scrutiny under the National Action Plan to counter terrorism, and as
urbanization drives the growth of Pakistan’s middle class, university
students are likely to be increasingly coveted by militant recruiters. 39
Pakistani journalist Huma Yusuf clearly expects the liberal context of
private elite universities such as the Lahore University of Management Sciences
to provide a more effective counter to radicalization and extremism. Yusuf
further observes that public campuses can also provide positive environments in
this regard, but that this depends on individual faculty and student attitudes
rather than systematic planning.
In interviews with students studying history and political science at a
public university in Lahore, I found them openly debating and challenging
the religious framing of the Pakistani national narrative. The main factors
that influenced them were studying the politics and history of other parts of
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the world, and a professor who engaged with them and taught them to
question prevalent narratives. But students in most engineering universities
and medical colleges face the same indoctrination in Pakistan’s ‚ideology‛
that they did in high school. And student wings of Islamist parties—in
particular the Jamāt-e-Islāmī’s student wing, the Islāmī Jamī‘at-e-Ṭalabā’—
threaten progressive discourse on many university campuses. They aim to
disrupt cultural events and prevent meaningful debate.‛40
An article by Pakistan-based Madiha Afzal published by the Voice of America
reached a similar conclusion that colleges where creativity, openness, and expressing
counter-narratives were promoted could constitute potential sites for countering
radicalization by virtue of the campus environments themselves.
Education experts say it’s important to build a counter-narrative and
cultivate an environment where youth can openly engage in conversations
on issues considered taboo in Pakistan. They believe outdated teaching
methods, lack of development of new skills, and absence of sports and
extracurricular activities lead to frustration allow youth to gravitate toward
violent terrorism.41
A prevalent perception is that, ‚The education system of Pakistan does
not train a student in logical/scientific inference or critical thinking. So he’s
unable to critically dissect the indoctrinating patterns.‛42 Faculty and
educationists therefore call for changing the curriculum and mass engagement at
the national level towards deradicalization. This should ‚involve teachers,
religious scholars, mosques, state, security forces – everyone.‛ 43

Campuses and Cultures
It is clear that in viewing campuses as potential sites for discouraging,
rather than encouraging radicalization; cultures play a critical role. The term
‚culture‛ has many definitions and connotations, academic and popular. Most
relevant for us is its most general meaning of what people, usually a particular
ethnic, local, or interest group, do. In this sense we may think of the expressions
‚foreign cultures‛, ‚popular culture‛, ‚the dominant culture‛ or ‚youth
culture‛. A second use of culture that developed in Europe during the 18th and
early 19th centuries is more evaluative as in ‚high culture‛, or being
‚cultured‛.44 Sociologists may use the term in yet a further sense of group or
institutional practices and tastes as in sub-cultures, counter-cultures, and yes—
campus cultures. In this respect distinctive campus cultures need to be
recognized and their potentials and threats taken into account. What positive
practices can be implemented in this regard?
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Most educationists believe that the humanities, and yes, the social
sciences, fields that offer ‘cultural experiences’ and tools for reflection and
analysis should be part of every education. Here at Air University we are
preaching to the choir since sponsorship of this conference comes on the part of
the Humanities Department that offers relevant courses in fields such as
Literature, Philosophy, Pakistan Studies, Islamiyat, Ethics, Psychology, and
Sociology.45
In considering potential deradicalization measures on campus then, we
must ask—which kind of campus—and clearly, it is not the campus itself that is
doing the radicalizing. What is or is not available at a particular institution that
might prevent or discourage radical tendencies and channel student energies in
more constructive directions? So—while on campus we may reject ‚surveillance
and curtailment of free speech and open inquiry‛, we also need to take proactive
measures to build on the skills and tastes of existing programs, faculty, and
students.
When it comes to the topic of Islam, we find striking differences between
the situation of Pakistani students and Muslim students in the West. Ideas about
Islam in Pakistan are much more likely to be charged and possibly even tabooed
from open discussion—either out of fear of stirring up conflict or oneself being
threatened and stigmatized, especially if one is from a minority sect of Islam or a
non-Muslim, or if one is a liberal or free thinker, and perhaps, depending on the
campus culture, if one prefers a certain Islamic scholar or preacher to another. In
an article based on interviews with Pakistani parents regarding their educational
choices for their children, religion was considered of importance by a very high
proportion. At the same time, presenting diverse views about religion was not
considered desirable by most.
Nelson observes:
Indeed, as my research unfolded, I quickly discovered that it was not any
specific expression of religious or sectarian difference, but rather the terms of
difference itself, that left my [Pakistani] respondents feeling uneasy and
uncomfortable. In fact, I discovered, difference itself was the thing that most
of my respondents had been taught to regard as undesirable, unacceptable
and, at some level, ostensibly ‘un-Islamic’.46
While in the West symbols of Muslim identity may in some cases lead to
marginalization of Muslim youth or surveillance; in contemporary Pakistan, the
exalted position of religion as part of the national narrative and identity can
unfortunately lead to it becoming a source of conflict. Here we have the link to
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identity—and most psychologists understand that threats to identity may
destabilize individuals and provoke emotional or even violent responses.
But let’s take for example, the case that campuses might attract elements
that wish to recruit students to radical or extreme causes. The state, or the college
administration working with the state may agree to surveillance, banning certain
groups or individuals, and not allowing certain ideas to be expressed.
However, on the positive side what could be done? We note that there is
another branch of literature that has to do with educational policy such as how to
design and offer a curriculum that could ideally provide individuals with the
intellectual resources that would preclude their becoming radicalized—i.e., that
would lead them to interrogate simplistic solutions, challenge demonizing
stereotypes of others, while giving them a sense of their personal and historical
contexts, thereby preventing them from thinking in essentialist and totalizing
ways and ultimately from responding violently.
It is difficult to imagine a single program for deradicalization on campus
due to the diversity across the campus ‘cultures’ nationwide where such results
would need to be implemented since even in a single nation or even city, class
backgrounds, disciplinary focus, and elite status of educational institutions play
significant roles in determining the attitudes and motivations of the youth who
attend them.
British education expert Lynn Davies has worked extensively on
challenges of educating for peace and tolerance in cultures where violence and
civil war are endemic. She has presented and consulted widely on the
international level for bodies such as UNESCO. Some of her ideas regarding the
presentation of religion may be resisted in conservative contexts but let me
present them here for discussion. Davies observes that:
Extremism is founded on the notion that there is one right answer, truth or
path, and that there are no alternatives. Conversely, critical education is
founded on the principle of accepting multiple realities, feeling comfortable
with ambiguity and searching for multiple truths, not one truth. An
uncritical respect for beliefs must be superseded by a respect or disrespect for
actions that are done in the name of these beliefs.47
With that in mind, she advocates:
1) Intra-religious education—dialogue within a faith and between all the
various sects, cults, branches, and value systems.
2) Critical analysis of mistakes made and human rights violations legitimized
in the name of religion
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3) Critical analysis of sacred texts to interrogate the more violent or
misogynistic parts
Davies’ framing of teaching ‚about‛ religion as part of history,
psychology, sociology, and international studies and cultures reflects modern
Western liberal views of the subject. This raises the question of whether in
Pakistan one can design and offer a curriculum that is faithful to Islamic norms
and Pakistani culture and yet values diversity of opinions, respect for individual
differences, and freedom of expression. Decades ago, there was a debate among
many Muslim thinkers about whether modernization (generally viewed as
positive and desirable) had to inevitably bring about Westernization (viewed
negatively as a corrupting influence). In many cases push back occurred against
ideas or practices that were stigmatized as being Western impositions on Islamic
societies. Topics such women’s rights or religious pluralism are sometimes still
resisted as being imposed from outside. In the meantime certain Muslim thinkers
struggle to recover elements from within Islamic tradition that support such
perceptions and values, seeing this as being the most productive way forward.
Aside from resistance to liberal and pluralistic ideas among some
conservative Muslim today, ‘culture’ itself has been contested in Islamic
tradition, both in early times and today as a potential source of non-Islamic or
unIslamic trends and currents. One example of this is the negative valuation of
non-Islamic culture represented by the term ‚Jāhiliyya‛ meaning the ‘Age of
Ignorance’. The culture of the pre-Islamic Jāhiliyya Arab tribes before the coming
of the revelation was considered to be rough, quarrelsome, and ignorant. In the
mid-20th century the term ‚Jāhiliyya‛ re-emerged in the writings of Islamists such
as Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) who condemned what he perceived as a new ignorant
age, defined by the West or by modernity in secular terms that were challenging
and changing the face and tastes of Muslim societies and needed to be resisted
by an Islamization of social and political institutions. In this model, Islam and its
corresponding social and political sphere conceived of as an ideal total system or
a complete way of life set off against a negative, non-Islamic alternative.
A further example of debates about culture in Islamic tradition involves
cultural Islamization and the approaches of scholars and jurists adjudicating the
experiences and practices of Muslims as they expanded to rule or live alongside
new populations possessing their own indigenous cultures and religions. As
Islamic empires stretched from Morocco to South East Asia and from Southern
Europe to Africa, another dimension of the interplay of Islam and culture was
embodied through the phenomenon of ‚cultural‛ Islamization—the gradual
assimilation of largely non-Arab pre-Islamic cultural practices, institutions, and
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tastes to be more in conformity with the teachings and practices of the Islamic
religion, including the rule of Islamic law (sharī‘a). Muslim intellectuals and
legal experts from the ages of the classical Muslim empires until today—for more
than a thousand years—have continued to discuss the relationship between
Islam and culture.
Many Muslim thinkers, among them Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi, an 18th
century figure, have struggled with the conceptual tension between the universal
claims of Islam as the final and complete revelation and the legitimacy and
persistence of particular historical and cultural articulations of previous
religions, including the role of pre-Islamic practices.48 The Islamic theology of
progressive revelation or supercessionism, placed Adam as the first Prophet to
receive divine guidance. Thus symbolically or theologically we might consider
that a certain recognition was given to all human cultural expressions as being
potentially compatible with Islamic norms or at least neutral. In the case of
perceived conflict of cultural practices with Islam, processes of deliberate
distortion or misguidance on the part of leaders, historical slippage, or the
deterioration of the original authentic divine guidance, were invoked as causal
factors.
Islam itself was not considered immune to these processes and hence
terms drawn from the earliest Muslims scriptures were applied to support
corrective processes such as ‚islāḥ‛ (reform or correction), ‚tajdīd‛ (renewal) and
‚iḥyā‛ (revival). In these cases it was not ‚Islam‛ itself that was conceived of as
being compromised but rather the ‚dīn‛, the sciences of religion, or even the
umma, the Muslim community.
Other Muslim thinkers, particularly in the realm of legal theory, have
debated the extent to which apparently sound or neutral pre-existing cultural
institutions and practices should be continued or adapted within Islamic
societies or in some cases imported from outside. In the realm of law, the Muslim
jurists use the terms ‘āda (custom) and ‘urf (good and acknowledged practice) to
indicate that culture, including non-Muslim cultural practices, could be
compatible with Islamic norms, even if they were not directly mandated by its
codes.
Their Qur’anic proof text for this was taken from verse 7:199:
ْ
ْ ُخ ِذ ْال َع ْف َو َو ۡا ُم ْر با ْل ُع ْر ِف َو َا ْعر
ض َع ِن الج ِھ ِل ۡین
ِ
ِ
‚Accept [from people] what comes naturally [for them]. Command what is
customarily [good]. And turn away from the ignorant [without responding
in kind].‛49
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Legal scholars coined the maxim that ‚cultural usage shall have the
weight of law‛ and followed the principle that fair judgments must take into
account the particular cultural realities under which diverse Muslims lived. The
early Hanafi scholar, Abū Yūsuf (d. 798), and the Medieval Maliki jurist, Shihāb
al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285) are examples of legal scholars who recognized good,
local, cultural norms as falling under the rubric of the sunna, broadening the
concept from specific precedents established by the Prophet Muhammad.50 These
classical Islamic jurists were positive toward culture while maintaining the
transcendent and shaping role accorded to religion.
A further example of debates surrounding cultural elements, involves the
concept of bid’a and the status of cultural products and expressions such as music
and popular celebrations in Muslim cultures. We find among classical Muslim
thinkers attitudes that sought to more strictly delimit the bounds of the
culturally acceptable. This was associated with the religious concept--‚bid’a‛.
Bid’a connotes the idea of innovation in a negative sense, a heretical innovation
in doctrine or practice, that attempts to interpolate something that is either alien
or newly concocted into Islamic belief or practice. On this ground a number of
cultural practices and even arts and music, totally or in part, were deemed
beyond the pale of Islamic legitimacy and condemned by some scholars.
A case illustrating this tension might be the use of music by certain South
Asian Sufis, the Chishtis, in their rituals. Sufism is the mystical interpretation of
the Islamic religion and historically its practices and institutions were very wide
spread and influential, particularly in areas of the world such as South Asia and
Africa where they interfaced well with pre-existing local cultures and religious
attitudes and practices. Some scholars credit Sufism with enabling the spread of
Islam due to its friendliness to local languages and practices, and its colorful and
embodied nature that engaged and absorbed local and folk traditions. Still many
Muslim religious scholars, classically and today, condemned Sufism as unIslamic
and deemed practices such as listening to devotional music to be ‚bid’a‛.
Recently Wahhabism, Salafism and such global puritanical trends have been
particularly hostile to Sufism and to cultural artifacts and expressions generally,
in some cases leading to violent attacks and bombings at Sufi shrines and other
cultural sites and performances.
Such debates about the permissibility of forms and genres of music and
art mark Islamic religious debates about culture from very early times until the
present, indicating another aspect of how the ‚cultural‛ may be construed as
variously alien, frivolous, hostile, or seductive according to certain
interpretations of religion. We therefore see on going tensions between the
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religious realm and the cultural one in many parts of the world, perhaps more
prominently in the case of Muslims, who have been confronted not only by
modernity, but by a modernity often defined in culturally alien terms.51
It is therefore understandable how signs of radicalization on Pakistani
campuses may be seen in objections to performances of music or artistic
exhibitions, such that certain individuals and groups try to become enforcers of
strict religious norms as they understand them and may even resort to threats of
violence to impose their views on others.
Most of the literature and cases of ‘deradicalization’ programs and
strategies in Western societies or in Muslim majority settings have involved
those already arrested for participation in or contemplating violent actions.
Speaking of what might be considered evidence for an individual’s
deradicalization, Kruglanski opines:
What does so qualify is the growing recognition that violence is either
morally wrong or ineffective as a means of significance attainment or (to a
lesser degree) that though it may be an appropriate for others, it is no longer
so for oneself. Disengagement in the latter sense is tantamount to
deradicalization and in effect constitutes the core of deradicalization. Indeed,
the major thrust of the various deradicalization programs was precisely to
delegitimize violence and condemn it morally.52
This view suggests a need to take a pragmatic approach to
deradicalization, in addition to changing ethical reasoning about violence. Many
countries, both Western and majority Muslim, have tried to bring radicals back
to the mainstream by offering religious and psychological counseling, as well as
vocational training and help in finding employment.53
If we consider these strategies in terms of the context considered here—
Pakistani universities—it seems that the one priority should be analyzing any
deficiencies in student services, specifically those offering social and
psychological support. In terms of challenging violence as a solution that is
religiously legitimated, one must consider enhancing the quality of areas of
campus life where religious norms and teachings are available to students. In
many cases Religious Studies or the academic study of Islam may not be
considered as a academic subject, leaving many students with only exposure to
simplistic ideas and interpretations about religion, especially Islam, Muslim
history and civilization. It is as if ideas connected with Islam for many are kept at
the level of childhood beliefs and forms of reasoning, such that matters of faith
and ethical thinking using Islamic tools and norms are relegated to blindly
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following whichever charismatic preacher is in fashion, or to engaging in a rote
memorization of the terminology of fiqh or ḥadīth studies.
The task of university humanities and social science programs is thus in
some cases remedial, in countering inadequate formation, both in religion and in
critical thinking, at primary and secondary levels, but also these subjects need to
be integrated within the broader curriculum of study so that all students, not
only those majoring in such fields, can benefit from and be empowered by
deeper and broader understandings of world history and the human condition,
including their own social and history location.
In an essay written almost a generation ago, Western Muslim scholar
‘Abdul Hakim Murad looks forward to challenges facing Muslim in the ‘new
millennium’54 In it he decried global trends among Muslims towards favoring
totalitarian trends, deeming Muslims holding divergent views as bound for Hell
thereby exhibiting a mentality close to Kharijite ‘takfīr’.
This therefore occasions the need to retreat and disown society - the idea
of Takfīr wa'l-Hijra that informed Shukrī Muṣṭafā's group in late 1970s Egypt. In
secretive inner circles, the saved elect gather to plan military-style actions against
the system. They are indifferent to the sufferings of civilians—for they are
apostates and deserve death anyway. Such attacks will prefigure, in some rather
vague and optimistic fashion, the coming to power of the true believers, and the
suppression of all other interpretations of religion.
This idea of takfīr wa'l-hijra is thus, in structural terms, a global
phenomenon. Its members are usually educated, almost always having
science rather than arts backgrounds. Technology is not disowned, but
sedulously cultivated. Bomb-making becomes a disciplined form of worship.
I believe that this tendency, which has been fostered rather than eliminated
by the repressiveness of the regimes, will grow in relative significance as we
traverse the end of the century. It will continue to besmirch the name of
Islam, by shooting tourists, or blowing up minor targets in pinprick attacks
that strengthen rather than weaken the regimes. It will divide the Islamic
movement, perhaps fatally. And it will provide the regimes with an excuse
further to repress and marginalise religion in society.55
These observations by Murad remain relevant and are pertinent to our
concerns with university cultures that might fail to disabuse students of neoKharijite thinking. We can see a confluence of cultural, identity, psycho-social, and
religious frameworks that need to be analyzed and addressed to counter perceptions
among educated youth that could lead to a valorization of violence in the name of
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Islam and an acceptance of the demonization of others in the society.
Also salient for a university milieu is Murad’s assessment that these
challenges in Muslim societies can best be met through ‚the cultivation of an
informed leadership.‛ Unfortunately, as Murad opines:
Most Muslim leaders cannot provide the intellectual guidance needed to help
intelligent young people deal with the challenges of today. Ask the average
Muslim activist how to prove a post-modernist wrong, and he will not be able to
help you very much. Our heads are buried in the ground. However, it is not
only intellectual trends which we ignore. The environment, too, is an
impending catastrophe which has not grabbed our attention at all. Perhaps our
activists will still be choking out their rival rhetoric on the correct way to hold
the hands during the Prayer, while they breath in the last mouthful of oxygen
available in their countries. They seem wholly oblivious to the problem.56
Murad’s thesis that, ‚Institutions, therefore, urgently need to be established,
to train young men and women both in traditional sharī‘a disciplines, and in the
cultural and intellectual language of today's world‛, should remind this audience of
numerous projects in the not so distant past and present—for example, Sir Sayyid
Ahmed Khan’s vision for Aligarh University, Muhammad Iqbal’s project of the
‚reconstruction of religious thought in Islam‛, as well as contemporary experiments
with forms of ‘enlightened moderation’.
For Pakistani colleges and universities to take up this mantle and assume
leadership roles in creating communities and environments where students can
flourish, both intellectually and in terms of character building and personal wellbeing, will take sustained and well-researched efforts on the part of administrators,
faculty, students and all stake holders in the success of these educational institutions
and the future of the nation. But it cannot be expected that faculty and upper
administrators have the skill sets on their own to promote healthy campus cultures.
Robust and well-trained units of student services and affairs need to be provided, as
do counseling service units, including something akin to the ‘Muslim chaplain’ role
emerging in Western university settings. Such roles have developed since having
religious knowledge alone does not guarantee that an individual religious teacher or
scholar will have the requisite insights into human psychology and the skills in
interpersonal relations involved in mentoring youth and other community members.
Perhaps that is why Western based Muslim scholars like Murad have spent
so much effort studying and translating the works of figures such as al-Ghazālī in
the spirit that Muslims need to recover and internalize their own resources for ‘adab’,
not merely in the sense of literary and cultural appreciation and competency, but
also for inculcating and inspiring behavioral beauty along the lines of ‘iḥsān’, mercy
and compassion, and constructive, rather than destructive, activism and criticism.
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The final element suggested by this review of existing measures to
deradicalize involves what comes after university study—are there meaningful job
opportunities, and for this audience, what role do universities play in facilitating the
employment for their graduates, leaving aside the role of the state and society as a
whole in this regard?
Providing resources is going to be challenging for the nation’s universities
and for policy makers at all levels, including the Higher Learning Commission. Is
there a broad and sustained consensus, together with adequate resources at the
provincial and national levels to make the requisite changes? Can universities
remediate on their campuses, negative results arising from deficiencies of the
educational system at earlier levels? This is a time to take stock of the false steps of
the past and see what can be achieved going forward.57
University educators and administrators must realize the tension between
the role of the university in cultivating the potential of the ‘radical’ in youth rather
than crushing or extinguishing it. The radical search for truth may challenge
frameworks of established knowledge that may blind us to our own complacency
and intellectual arrogance or laziness. In English—being a ‘radical’ may also have
the positive connotation of striving to get to the root, essence, or truth of things. In
Urdu, the term ‘radical’ may be translated by ‚intihāpasand‛—which is more like
‚extremist‛ or ‚bunyādparast‛ which conveys the idea of being too devoted to or
absorbed in claiming access to the foundation to the extent of ‚worshipping‛ it. The
term ‚usūlī‛, however, captures some of the positive connotations of the radical in
aiming to get to the source, or even of being principled. Pakistan’s universities, when
both principled and committed to the search for truth, should strive to unfetter the
intellectual and social abilities of their students while empowering them to
intellectually and morally reject the dead end of violent extremism.

Note: This paper was presented by the author at the three-day International
Conference on Radicalization: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges of Campus
Life, organized by Air University Islamabad on 26-28, September, 2018.
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